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end logistics pipeline. As Distribution Process Owner (DPO), USTRANSCOM has set up a theater command and control (C2) construct that includes the Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR) and the Deployment Distribution Operations Center (DDOC). This paper examines the C2 construct to determine if redundancies exist and whether one or the other function should be eliminated. The thesis is supported through a task analysis of the doctrinal tasks assigned to the DIRMOBFOR and the DDOC. The analysis focuses on the C2 relationship of the DIRMOBFOR and the DDOC with the goal of examining how each contributes to the accomplishment of USTRANSCOM's mission. The analysis identifies the tasks required to bridge the gaps between the three levels of logistics; strategic, operational, and tactical. The comparison of tasks shows the DDOC has clearer C2 links and therefore provides a better foundation for executing operational logistics than the DIRMOBFOR. The paper recommends that the DDOC Chief assume the in-theater duties previously assigned to the DIRMOBFOR and eliminate the latter position because its functions are redundant and adversely affect JTF C2.
INTRODUCTION
History has proven repeatedly that logistics is the key to successful military operations. Failure to account for operational logistics in the command and control structure will result in unmet operational objectives; consider-Napoleon's push to Russia, Russia fighting the Crimean War, or the German Schlieffen plan in WWI. Seizing control of the operational factors of time, space and force to get to the fight, sustain the forces during the fight and get them home following the conflict are vital considerations for the operational commander. Each service plays a crucial role in providing logistics for their forces; however, to ensure efficient and effective logistics for the Joint Task Force (JTF), someone needs to oversee the end-to-end logistics pipeline. In 2003, the Secretary of Defense designated USTRANSCOM the Distribution Process Owner (DPO) and with that the responsibility to provide interoperability, synchronization of the DOD end-to-end distribution network through coordination and oversight. 1 In a 2008 letter to DPO stakeholders, the USTRANSCOM Commander stated the DPO will "build an integrated, networked, end-toend distribution capability that delivers for the warfighter the "right place," at the "right time" and at the best value for the nation. 2 In order to achieve this vision, TRANSCOM has set up a theater command and control (C2) construct that includes the Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR) and the Deployment Distribution Operations Center (DDOC). This paper examines the C2 construct and concludes that the DIRMOBFOR is a redundant position and should be eliminated. This thesis is supported through a task analysis of the doctrinal tasks assigned to the DIRMOBFOR and the DDOC but first attempts to clarify the problem by looking at the background of each organization.
BACKGROUND
The business of joint logistics has never been more important to the US military than now. The transition from a fixed location force to an expeditionary force places a tremendous demand on the ability to deploy and sustain the military to accomplish the nation's objectives. Making joint logistics complicated in this new environment because it spans all three levels of war; strategic, operational and tactical. To bridge the gaps between the different levels of war, clear command and control are essential.
Command and control is one of the most crucial of all operational functions. The framework integrates all theater-wide functions and allows the operational commander to synchronize the sources of national power he has available in the theater. 3 From the logistics perspective, a good C2 structure allows for effective use of available logistics resources.
Unity of joint logistics is difficult and without unity, controlling logistics is challenging.
Synchronizing the actions of USTRANSCOM, DLA and the services is critical to the successful execution of intertheater distribution and hinges on unity of effort. When considering the logistics organizations in the theater it is important to remember that COCOM includes authority for the Joint Force Command (JFC), to exercise directive authority for logistics. 4 This authority allows use of all logistics capabilities of the forces assigned and/or attached to accomplish the mission. Often a point of contention is the fact that logistics is a service responsibility; however, the JFC needs control over the tasks and processes to achieve his objectives. These capabilities allow the DDOC to synchronize the strategic flow of forces and sustainment to the operational level by providing expertise and data to other elements of the JTF C2 network. Furthermore, the DDOC coordinates common-user and commercial capabilities to meet JFC requirements.
14 Good logistics can mean the difference between victory and defeat so the JFC needs a logistics C2 network that is both effective and efficient. When conflict or action requires the stand-up of a Joint Task Force, clear command and control is imperative. One common deficiency of the JTF is a staff lacking familiarity of the area in which they will operate. This is true because historically, the military waits until a contingency to develop a theater logistics system. The DDOC overcomes this deficiency through its enduring presence in the theater, thus when forming the JTF, the DDOC brings with it a team familiar with the area.
The DDOC construct provides a standing logistics organization, with established relationships at the operational level that is familiar with the theater. Whether using the standing DDOC or a DDOC-Forward in time of crisis, the JFC will start with an established team that has clear C2 relationships to ensure success early. This is not the case with the DIRMOBFOR, since this leader is selected at the beginning of crisis action planning and must be rolled into the theater C2 structure after the fact. While the goal is seamless logistics for the war fighter, how to achieve that remains the question. Next, this paper will evaluate the roles of the DDOC and the DIRMOBFOR to determine the necessity of both.
Insufficient contribution, duplication of effort and complicated C2 may not warrant continued support in a time with increased emphasis on effectiveness and efficiency.
ANALYSIS
This analysis will focus on the C2 relationship for two of USTRANSCOM's key enablers at the JTF level-the DIRMOBFOR and the DDOC. The goal is to examine how each contributes to the accomplishment of USTRANSCOM's mission while considering how they fit into the C2 framework. The analysis will identify the key tasks for USTRANSCOM, the DIRMOBFOR and the DDOC using DOD directives and doctrine. Then while looking at how each enabler fits into the JTF C2 structure, consider how each contributes to the execution of operational logistics.
It is necessary to characterize the set of assumptions used in this analysis. This study looks at a snapshot of DPO functions from the perspective of providing support to a JTF to accomplish its objectives. Therefore, this paper will look at the baseline functions available to the JFC and not at a specific operation. To this end implied tasks were not considered because only the tasks inherent to USTRANSCOM and the two enablers are critical to this evaluation. Additionally, essential tasks were only labeled for USTRANSCOM and identified with underlined text on the task list. Neither the DIRMOBFOR nor DDOC support all USTRANSCOM tasks. The assumption is that the USTRANSCOM staff or other enablers accomplish those tasks, which is beyond the scope of this study.
The analysis began by reviewing current DOD Directives and Instructions, Joint and Service Doctrine considering the tasks required each organization to accomplish its mission. These standardized operational tasks are the ones requiring assistance from the enablers, the DIRMOBFOR and DDOC, to ensure success at the operational level for the JFC.
Analysis of the DIRMOBFOR and DDOC using the same method found functions in JP 3-17, JP 4-0, JP 4-09, AFDD 2, and AFDD 2-6. See Appendix B and C respectively for a complete listing of the specified tasks for the DIRMOBFOR and DDOC.
The review directed at the DIRMOBFOR found five specified tasks, listed below. Notice that tasks have the DIRMOBFOR coordinating with another entity or organization.
1. Coordinate integration of intertheater air mobility capability provided by USTRANSCOM.
2. In concert with the AOC director, facilitate the tasking and effective and efficient employment of air mobility forces assigned or attached to the JFC.
3. Coordinate with the AOC director and AMD chief to ensure all air mobility operation supporting the JFC are integrated into the air assessment, planning and execution process and deconflict with other air operations.
4. Coordinate with the TACC and USTRANSCOM to ensure the joint force air mobility support requirements are met.
5. Coordinate the integration of the multinational air mobility plan.
These five doctrinal tasks translate into one UJTL standardized operational task, OP 5.4.5
Coordinate/Integrate Component, Theater, and Other Support. 18 It is important to point out that doctrine assigns duties to the DIRMOBFOR with respect to air transportation only.
There are no provisions in doctrine for the DIRMOBFOR to do any coordination for other modes of transportation.
The review focusing on the DDOC found 6 primary and 13 sub specified tasks, primary tasks listed below. 19 Unlike the DIRMOBFOR list, the DDOC list contains active tasks, for example: direct, manage, establish, plan and synchronize.
1. Direct GCC deployment, redeployment, and distribution.
2. Provide Asset Visibility (AV) and In Transit Visibility (ITV) of force flow, sustainment and retrograde.
4. Plan, coordinate and synchronize strategic and operational deployment and distribution with theater forces and National Logistics Partners.
5. Develop strategic and operational deployment and distribution performance measures.
6. Perform container, 463L airlift equipment (air pallets and nets), Radio Frequency Identification Device (RFID) tag and other intermodal equipment oversight responsibilities.
These six doctrinal tasks translate into five UJTL standardized operational tasks. According to the leadership in the field, if the DIRMOBFOR follows the chain-of-command as described in AFDD 2-6, see Figure 1 above, they will coordinate their airlift requirements through the Joint Movement Center (JMC) and DDOC. 24 By working through the JMC/DDOC, and not directly with USTRANSCOM, the DIRMOBFOR ensures synergy of theater logistics leaders to meet the needs of the JTF.
When considering the tasks the DIRMOBFOR and the DDOC perform and how each fits into the JTF C2 structure the question arises as to why not combine the duties and eliminate the DIRMOBFOR. The C2 structure of any organization should be simple, simplified logistics C2 network and a senior logistician in the theater with a span of influence over all modes of transportation.
28

COUNTER ARGUMENTS
The DIRMOBFOR integrates into the C2 structure, albeit with some redundancies, and has functioned for nearly two decades. Considering the successes of this construct could fuel the debate about whether or not the findings of this analysis are valid. Additionally, DIRMOBFOR proponents say having a single person serve as coordinator of limited common-user logistics assets adds value to the JTF.
Supporters of the DIRMOBFOR could claim doctrine is a starting point, and the analysis completed in this paper does not look into the execution of logistics at the operational level. Doctrine provides a common framework for military organizations to bridge the gap between theory and practice. 29 In this case, the doctrine prescribes tasks the DIRMOBFOR and the DDOC are to perform in their role as USTRANSCOM enablers but the framework established in the doctrine is not absolute. Without a thorough review of the development of the doctrine for each enabler, one could argue against using doctrine as a basis for review. Doctrine can be contradictory and often requires compromise between competing views when written. 30 Looking at the DIRMOBFOR C2 structure, as defined above in Figure 1 , the link from JTF to USTRANSCOM is through the DIRMOBFOR and not the DDOC. The separate paths of coordination could lead to a perceived duplication of effort between the DIRMOBFOR and the DDOC. Furthermore, without a more in-depth 28 Dennis L. D'Angelo, "DDOC Research Questions," October 4, 2010. 29 Milan Vego, Joint Operational Warfare, XII-3. 30 Ibid., analysis, one could reason the DIRMOBFOR was directly responsible for the logistics success in recent operations.
Of the numerous tools available to enable USTRANSCOM, some may argue the best tool is a flag officer embedded in the JTF. While there is no rank specification in doctrine for the DIRMOBFOR, the position is normally filled by a USAF brigadier general. Rank selection is important since the DIRMOBFOR is normally assigned to the JFACC's special staff. 31 The assumption is that choosing a general officer as DIRMOBFOR guarantees him a seat at the table with the other JTF generals. AFDD 2-6 says, "the DIRMOBFOR is the COMAFFOR's designated coordinating authority with all agencies affecting air mobility operations… [and] is also the advisor on how best to effectively and efficiently use air mobility assets." 6. Perform container, 463L airlift equipment (air pallets and nets), Radio Frequency Identification Device (RFID) tag and other intermodal equipment oversight responsibilities (JDDOC Template 3) a. Theater container management is a GCC function that can be assigned to the JDDOC (JP 4-09 IV-31)
